Course In Game Theory - 94 edition

Osborne, Martin J. : University of Toronto

Rubinstein, Ariel : Tel Aviv University.

Preface


Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Game Theory
1.2 Games and Solutions
1.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium
1.4 Rational Behavior
1.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations
1.6 Bounded Rationality
1.7 Terminology and Notation

Notes

PART I. STRATEGIC GAMES

Chapter 2. Nash Equilibrium

2.1 Strategic Games
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
2.3 Examples
2.4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
2.5 Strictly Competitive Games
2.6 Bayesian Games : Strategic Games with Imperfect Information

Notes

Chapter 3. Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium

3.1 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
3.2 Interpretations of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
3.3 Correlated Equilibrium
3.4 Evolutionary Equilibrium

Notes

Chapter 4. Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions

4.1 Rationalizability
4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions
4.3 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions

Notes

Chapter 5. Knowledge and Equilibrium

5.1 A Model of Knowledge
5.2 Common Knowledge
5.3 Can People Agree to Disagree?
5.4 Knowledge and Solution Concepts
5.5 The Electronic Mail Game

Notes

PART II. EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION

Chapter 6. Extensive Games with Perfect Information

6.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information
6.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
6.3 Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game
6.4 The Interpretation of a Strategy
6.5 Two Notable Finite Horizon Games
6.6 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies

Notes

Chapter 7. Bargaining Games

7.1 Bargaining and Game Theory
7.2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers
7.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
7.4 Variations and Extensions

Notes

Chapter 8. Repeated Games

8.1 The Basic Idea
8.2 Infinitely Repeated Games vs.\ Finitely Repeated Games
8.3 Infinitely Repeated Games : Definitions
8.4 Strategies as Machines
8.5 Trigger Strategies : Nash Folk Theorems
8.6 Punishing for a Limited Length of Time : A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Limit of Means Criterion
8.7 Punishing the Punisher : A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Overtaking Criterion
8.8 Rewarding Players Who Punish : A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Discounting Criterion
8.9 The Structure of Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the Discounting Criterion
8.10 Finitely Repeated Games

Notes

Chapter 9. Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games

9.1 Introduction 163
9.2 Complexity and the Machine Game
9.3 The Structure of the Equilibria of a Machine Game
9.4 The Case of Lexicographic Preferences

Notes

Chapter 10. Implementation Theory

10.1 Introduction
10.2 The Implementation Problem
10.3 Implementation in Dominant Strategies
10.4 Nash Implementation
10.5 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Implementation

Notes

PART III. EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION

Chapter 11. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information

11.1 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
11.2 Principles for the Equivalence of Extensive Games
11.3 Framing Effects and the Equivalence of Extensive Games
11.4 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies
11.5 Nash Equilibrium

Notes

Chapter 12. Sequential Equilibrium

12.1 Strategies and Beliefs
12.2 Sequential Equilibrium
12.3 Games with Observable Actions : Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
12.4 Refinements of Sequential Equilibrium
12.5 Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium

Notes

PART IV. COALITIONAL GAMES

Chapter 13. The Core

13.1 Coalitional Games with Transferable Payoff
13.2 The Core
13.3 Nonemptiness of the Core
13.4 Markets with Transferable Payoff
13.5 Coalitional Games without Transferable Payoff
13.6 Exchange Economies

Notes

Chapter 14. Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value

14.1 Two Approaches
14.2 The Stable Sets of von Neumann and Morgenstern
14.3 The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus
14.4 The Shapley Value

Notes

Chapter 15. The Nash Solution

15.1 Bargaining Problems
15.2 The Nash Solution : Definition and Characterization
15.3 An Axiomatic Definition
15.4 The Nash Solution and the Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers
15.5 An Exact Implementation of the Nash Solution

Notes

List of Results
References
Index