ISBN13:978-0262650403 ISBN10: 0262650401 This edition has also been released as: ISBN13: 978-0262150415 ISBN10: 0262150417
Summary: A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, ext
ensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
Summary: A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises. ...show less
Edition/Copyright:94 Cover: Paperback Publisher:MIT Press Year Published: 1994 International: No
View Author Bio
Osborne, Martin J. : University of Toronto
Rubinstein, Ariel : Tel Aviv University.
View Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Game Theory 1.2 Games and Solutions 1.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium 1.4 Rational Behavior 1.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations 1.6 Bounded Rationality 1.7 Terminology and Notation
PART I. STRATEGIC GAMES
Chapter 2. Nash Equilibrium
2.1 Strategic Games 2.2 Nash Equilibrium 2.3 Examples 2.4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium 2.5 Strictly Competitive Games 2.6 Bayesian Games : Strategic Games with Imperfect Information
Chapter 3. Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium
Chapter 4. Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions
4.1 Rationalizability 4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions 4.3 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions
Chapter 5. Knowledge and Equilibrium
5.1 A Model of Knowledge 5.2 Common Knowledge 5.3 Can People Agree to Disagree? 5.4 Knowledge and Solution Concepts 5.5 The Electronic Mail Game
PART II. EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
Chapter 6. Extensive Games with Perfect Information
6.1 Extensive Games with Perfect Information 6.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 6.3 Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game 6.4 The Interpretation of a Strategy 6.5 Two Notable Finite Horizon Games 6.6 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies
Chapter 7. Bargaining Games
7.1 Bargaining and Game Theory 7.2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 7.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 7.4 Variations and Extensions
Chapter 8. Repeated Games
8.1 The Basic Idea 8.2 Infinitely Repeated Games vs.\ Finitely Repeated Games 8.3 Infinitely Repeated Games : Definitions 8.4 Strategies as Machines 8.5 Trigger Strategies : Nash Folk Theorems 8.6 Punishing for a Limited Length of Time : A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Limit of Means Criterion 8.7 Punishing the Punisher : A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Overtaking Criterion 8.8 Rewarding Players Who Punish : A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Discounting Criterion 8.9 The Structure of Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the Discounting Criterion 8.10 Finitely Repeated Games
Chapter 9. Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games
9.1 Introduction 163 9.2 Complexity and the Machine Game 9.3 The Structure of the Equilibria of a Machine Game 9.4 The Case of Lexicographic Preferences
Chapter 10. Implementation Theory
10.1 Introduction 10.2 The Implementation Problem 10.3 Implementation in Dominant Strategies 10.4 Nash Implementation 10.5 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Implementation
PART III. EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
Chapter 11. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
11.1 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 11.2 Principles for the Equivalence of Extensive Games 11.3 Framing Effects and the Equivalence of Extensive Games 11.4 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies 11.5 Nash Equilibrium
Chapter 12. Sequential Equilibrium
12.1 Strategies and Beliefs 12.2 Sequential Equilibrium 12.3 Games with Observable Actions : Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 12.4 Refinements of Sequential Equilibrium 12.5 Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium
PART IV. COALITIONAL GAMES
Chapter 13. The Core
13.1 Coalitional Games with Transferable Payoff 13.2 The Core 13.3 Nonemptiness of the Core 13.4 Markets with Transferable Payoff 13.5 Coalitional Games without Transferable Payoff 13.6 Exchange Economies
Chapter 14. Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value
14.1 Two Approaches 14.2 The Stable Sets of von Neumann and Morgenstern 14.3 The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus 14.4 The Shapley Value
Chapter 15. The Nash Solution
15.1 Bargaining Problems 15.2 The Nash Solution : Definition and Characterization 15.3 An Axiomatic Definition 15.4 The Nash Solution and the Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 15.5 An Exact Implementation of the Nash Solution
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