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Game Theory and the Law

Game Theory and the Law - 94 edition

Game Theory and the Law - 94 edition

ISBN13: 9780674341111

ISBN10: 0674341112

Game Theory and the Law by Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner and Randal Picker - ISBN 9780674341111
Edition: 94
Copyright: 1994
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Published: 1994
International: No
Game Theory and the Law by Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner and Randal Picker - ISBN 9780674341111

ISBN13: 9780674341111

ISBN10: 0674341112


This book is the first to apply the tools of game theory and information economics to advance our understanding of how laws work. Organized around the major solution concepts of game theory, it shows how such well known games as the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of the sexes, beer-quiche, and the Rubinstein bargaining game can illuminate many different kinds of legal problems.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game

The Normal Form Game
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
The Nash Equilibrium
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
Bibliographic Notes

Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game

The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
Subgame Perfection
Bibliographic Notes

Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation

Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
Bibliographic Notes

Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information

Signaling and Screening
Modeling Nonverifiable Information
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
Bibliographic Notes

Reputation and Repeated Games

Backwards Induction and Its Limits
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
Bibliographic Notes

Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models

Collective Action and the Role of Law
Embedded Games
Understanding the Structure of Large Games
Collective Action and Private Information
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
Herd Behavior
Bibliographic Notes

Noncooperative Bargaining

Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
Legal Rules as Exit Options
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
Bibliographic Notes

Bargaining and Information

Basic Models of the Litigation Process
Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
Information and Selection Bias
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
Bibliographic Notes

Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law


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