Game Theory And The Law - 94 edition

"The most comprehensive and encompassing treatment of this approach...[This] is the first nontechnical, modern introduction to how (noncooperative) game theory can be applied specifically to legal analysis...Game Theory and the Law is a user-friendly analysis of concrete, numerical examples, rather than a theoretical presentation of abstract concepts. The authors introduce and explain, with actual legal cases or hypotheticals, the salient issues of modern game theory. This breadth of coverage is remarkable. This is not just a textbook; it is also something of a research monograph, introducing many new models attributable to the authors alone."

--Peter H. Huang, Jurimetrics Journal

"Game Theory and the Law is an important book. It is important in the sense that it will serve as a catalyst for an expanded use of game-theoretic models in the study of law. It will be a book that people will one day recognize as having had a considerable influence on its field. And it will receive the praise that accompanies such influence. Happily, such influence will be beneficial to the field of law and such praise will be richly deserved, because Game Theory and the Law is an extremely intelligent and thoughtful text...One of the features of the book that is most striking (and, for my part, most welcome) is the thoughtful and sensible manner in which they approach the use of game theory. Unlike many proponents of game-theoretic analysis, they do not present it as the only legitimate approach to social-scientific analysis. The authors present game theory as a powerful tool that can be used along with other approaches to enhance our understanding of the role of law in social life...The persuasiveness of their general argument for the utility of game theory derives from a combination of the power of their insights along with the sensibility of their analysis. The book is written in a clear, concise and interesting manner. Its bibliographic references render it a source book for additional research in both game theory and law. This is a book that should be read by scholars of law in particular and scholars of political behavior in particular."

--Jack Knight, Law and Politics Book Review

"Game Theory and the Law promises to be the definitive guide to the field. It provides a highly sophisticated yet exceptionally clear explanation of game theory, with a host of applications to legal issues. The authors have not only synthesized the existing scholarship, but also created the foundation for the next generation of research in law and economics."

--Daniel A. Farber, University of Minnesota Law School

Submitted By Publisher, October, 2002

Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game

The Normal Form Game
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
The Nash Equilibrium
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game

The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
Subgame Perfection
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation

Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of
Renegotiation
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information

Signaling and Screening
Modeling Nonverifiable Information
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

Reputation and Repeated Games

Backwards Induction and Its Limits
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models

Collective Action and the Role of Law
Embedded Games
Understanding the Structure of Large Games
Collective Action and Private Information
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
Herd Behavior
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

Noncooperative Bargaining

Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
Legal Rules as Exit Options
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

Bargaining and Information

Basic Models of the Litigation Process
Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
Information and Selection Bias
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
Summary
Bibliographic Notes

Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law

Notes
References
Glossary
Index