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Industrial Organization

Industrial Organization - 4th edition

Industrial Organization - 4th edition

ISBN13: 9781405176323

ISBN10: 1405176326

Industrial Organization by Pepall Lynne and Richards Dan - ISBN 9781405176323
Cover type: Hardback
Edition: 4TH 08
Copyright: 2008
Publisher: South-Western Publishing Co.
Published: 2008
International: No
Industrial Organization by Pepall Lynne and Richards Dan - ISBN 9781405176323

ISBN13: 9781405176323

ISBN10: 1405176326

Cover type: Hardback
Edition: 4TH 08

List price: $117.50

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The bestselling textbook, ''Industrial Organization,'' now in its fourth edition, uniquely uses the tools of game theory, information economics, contracting issues, practical examples, and optional econometric appendices to examine all facets of industrial organization and to enhance students' understanding of the strategic behavior of firms, the structure of markets, and imperfect competition. A new series of appendices that comprehensively explore relevant econometric issues will provide a more challenging and relevant option for instructors and students. Provides a comprehensive guide to industrial organization in the imperfect market conditions of the real world Includes coverage of the latest cutting edge research and public policy developments Features stronger coverage of information economics, contracting issues and game theory than other textbooks Instructor materials will be available. Visit for more information

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

List of Figures.
List of Tables.
About the Authors.
Preface to the Fourth Edition.

Part I: Foundations:. 1. Industrial Organization: What, How, and Why?. 1.1 What Is Industrial Organization?. 1.2 How We Study Industrial Organization. 1.3 Why? Antitrust and Industrial Organization Theory. Summary. Problems. References. Appendix: Excerpts from Key Antitrust Statutes.

2. Basic Microeconomics. 2.1 Competition versus Monopoly: The Poles of Market Performance. 2.2 Profit Today versus Profit Tomorrow: Firm Decision-making over Time. 2.3 Efficiency, Surplus, and Size Relative to the Market. Summary. Problems. References.

3. Market Structure and Market Power. 3.1 Measuring Market Structure. 3.2 Measuring Market Power. 3.3 Empirical Application: Monopoly Power-How Bad Is It?. Summary. Problems. References.

4. Technology and Cost. 4.1 Production Technology and Cost Functions for the Single-product Firms. 4.2 Sunk Cost and Market Structure. 4.3 Costs and Multiproduct Firms. 4.4 Noncost Determinants of Industry Structure. 4.5 Empirical Application: Cost Function Estimation-Scale and Scope Economies. Summary. Problems. References.

Part II: Monopoly Power in Theory and Practice:.

5. Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Linear Pricing. 5.1 Feasibility of Price Discrimination. 5.2 Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing. 5.3 Implementing Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing. 5.4 Product Variety and Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing. 5.5 Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing and Social Welfare. Summary. Problems. References.

6. Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Non-linear Pricing. 6.1 First-degree Price Discrimination or Personalized Pricing. 6.2 Second-degree Price Discrimination or Menu Pricing. 6.3 Social Welfare with First- and Second-degree Price Discrimination. Summary. Problems. References.

7. Product Variety and Quality Under Monopoly. 7.1 A Spatial Approach to Horizontal Product Differentiation. 7.2 Monopoly and Horizontal Differentiation. 7.3 Is There Too Much Product Variety?. 7.4 Monopoly and Horizontal Differentiation with Price Discrimination. 7.5 Vertical Product Differentiation. 7.6 Empirical Application: Price Discrimination, Product Variety, and Monopoly versus Competition. Summary. Problems. References. Appendix A: Location Choice with Two Shops. Appendix B: The Monopolist's Choice of Price When Her Shops Have Different Costs.

8. Commodity Bundling and Tie-in Sales. 8.1 Commodity Bundling and Price Discrimination. 8.2 Required Tie-in Sales. 8.3 Complementary Goods, Network Externalities, and Monopoly Pricing. 8.4 Antitrust, Bundling, and Tie-in Sales. Summary. Problems. References. Appendix: Formal Proof on the Inefficiency Induced by the Marketing of Complementary Goods by Separate Monopolists.

Part III: Oligopoly and Strategic Interaction:.

9. Static Games and Cournot Competition. 9.1 Strategic Interaction: Introduction to Game Theory. 9.2 Dominant and Dominated Strategies. 9.3 Nash Equilibrium as a Solution Concept. 9.4 Static Models of Oligopoly: The Cournot Model. 9.5 Variations on the Cournot Theme: Many Firms and Different Costs. 9.6 Concentration and Profitability in the Cournot Model. Summary. Problems. References.

10. Price Competition. 10.1 The Bertrand Duopoly Model. 10.2 Bertrand Reconsidered. 10.3 Bertrand in a Spatial Setting. 10.4 Strategic Complements and Substitutes. 10.5 Empirical Application: Brand Competition and Consumer Preferences-Evidence from the California Retail Gasoline Market. Summary. Problems. References.

11. Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers. 11.1 The Stackelberg Model of Quantity Competition. 11.2 Sequential Price Competition. 11.3 Credibility of Threats and Nash Equilibria for Dynamic Games. 11.4 The Chain Store Paradox. Summary.<

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