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Personnal Economics

Personnal Economics - 07 edition

Personnal Economics - 07 edition

ISBN13: 9780131488564

ISBN10: 0131488562

Personnal Economics by William S. Neilson - ISBN 9780131488564
Edition: 07
Copyright: 2007
Publisher: Prentice Hall, Inc.
Published: 2007
International: No
Personnal Economics by William S. Neilson - ISBN 9780131488564

ISBN13: 9780131488564

ISBN10: 0131488562

Edition: 07

Summary

Neilson is the first Personnel Economics text written specifically for economics majors, and is the only undergraduate text on information economics. Students love this course because it is so applied everyone is involved in an employment relationship at one time or another, and the students learn what strategies employers use as well as how employees should respond to them. Professors love it because they get to teach what Micro economists actually do: principal-agent problems, signaling problems, repeated games, bargaining, and much more.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Preface

1. Introduction The Economics of the Employment Relationship The Economics of Incentives and Information

2. Optimization "How Muchrdquo; Decisions and Marginal Analysis Global Optimization General Lessons A Classic Example: The Short-Run Competitive Firm

3. Traditional Labor Market Analysis The Firm's Problem The Worker's Problem Labor Markets Labor Market Analysis and Personnel Economics

4. Compensation and Motivation Worker Effort and Efficiency Compensation Schemes and Effort Choices Piece rates. Straight salary. Box: Do workers on salary work less than those who are paid for performance? Quotas. Commission. Box: Do workers really work harder when commission rates go up? General Lessons

5. Piece Rates Piece Rates at Safelite Glass Optimal Piece Rates General Lessons A Closer Look at the Salary Component Optimal Sales Commissions Motivating the Wrong Behavior

6. Problems with Piece Rates Should Teachers be Paid for Performance? Box: Do incentives lead to "teaching to the test?rdquo; Multiple Tasks Imperfectly-Observed Effort General Lessons The Equal Compensation Principle. The Incentive Intensity Principle.

7. Motivating Multiple Types The Full-Information Case Moral Hazard The Optimal Contract for the Hidden-Information Setting General

Lessons 8. Game Theory What is a Game?

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