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Theory of Learning in Games

Theory of Learning in Games - 98 edition

Theory of Learning in Games - 98 edition

ISBN13: 9780262061940

ISBN10: 0262061945

Theory of Learning in Games by Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine - ISBN 9780262061940
Edition: 98
Copyright: 1998
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 1998
International: No
Theory of Learning in Games by Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine - ISBN 9780262061940

ISBN13: 9780262061940

ISBN10: 0262061945

Summary

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Series Foreword
Acknowledgments

1 Introduction
2 Fictitious Play
3 Replicator Dynamics and Related Deterministic Models of Evolution
4 Stochastic Fictitious Play and Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
5 Adjustment Models with Persistent Randomness
6 Extensive-Form Games and Self-confirming Equilibrium
7 Nash Equilibrium, Large Population Models, and Mutations in Extensive-Form Games
8 Sophisticated Learning

Index

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