Game Theory and the Law - 94 edition
Game Theory and the Law - 94 edition
ISBN13: 9780674341111
ISBN10: 0674341112
by Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner and Randal Picker
Cover type: PaperbackEdition: 94
Copyright: 1994
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Published: 1994
International: No
ISBN13: 9780674341111
ISBN10: 0674341112
List price: $46.00
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Summary
This book is the first to apply the tools of game theory and information economics to advance our understanding of how laws work. Organized around the major solution concepts of game theory, it shows how such well known games as the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of the sexes, beer-quiche, and the Rubinstein bargaining game can illuminate many different kinds of legal problems.
Table of Contents
Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game
The Normal Form Game
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
The Nash Equilibrium
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game
The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
Subgame Perfection
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation
Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of
Renegotiation
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information
Signaling and Screening
Modeling Nonverifiable Information
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Reputation and Repeated Games
Backwards Induction and Its Limits
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models
Collective Action and the Role of Law
Embedded Games
Understanding the Structure of Large Games
Collective Action and Private Information
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
Herd Behavior
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Noncooperative Bargaining
Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
Legal Rules as Exit Options
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Bargaining and Information
Basic Models of the Litigation Process
Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
Information and Selection Bias
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law
Notes
References
Glossary
Index
shop us with confidence
This book is the first to apply the tools of game theory and information economics to advance our understanding of how laws work. Organized around the major solution concepts of game theory, it shows how such well known games as the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of the sexes, beer-quiche, and the Rubinstein bargaining game can illuminate many different kinds of legal problems.
Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game
The Normal Form Game
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
The Nash Equilibrium
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game
The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
Subgame Perfection
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation
Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of
Renegotiation
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information
Signaling and Screening
Modeling Nonverifiable Information
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Reputation and Repeated Games
Backwards Induction and Its Limits
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models
Collective Action and the Role of Law
Embedded Games
Understanding the Structure of Large Games
Collective Action and Private Information
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
Herd Behavior
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Noncooperative Bargaining
Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
Legal Rules as Exit Options
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Bargaining and Information
Basic Models of the Litigation Process
Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
Information and Selection Bias
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law
Notes
References
Glossary
Index
Published: 1994
International: No
Summary
This book is the first to apply the tools of game theory and information economics to advance our understanding of how laws work. Organized around the major solution concepts of game theory, it shows how such well known games as the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of the sexes, beer-quiche, and the Rubinstein bargaining game can illuminate many different kinds of legal problems.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game
The Normal Form Game
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
The Nash Equilibrium
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game
The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
Subgame Perfection
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation
Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of
Renegotiation
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information
Signaling and Screening
Modeling Nonverifiable Information
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Reputation and Repeated Games
Backwards Induction and Its Limits
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models
Collective Action and the Role of Law
Embedded Games
Understanding the Structure of Large Games
Collective Action and Private Information
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
Herd Behavior
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Noncooperative Bargaining
Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
Legal Rules as Exit Options
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Bargaining and Information
Basic Models of the Litigation Process
Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
Information and Selection Bias
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
Summary
Bibliographic Notes
Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law
Notes
References
Glossary
Index
